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# Pocket ID v2.19.3 fixes OAuth device approval flaw that enables account takeover
- URL: https://ping2prompt.com/pocket-id-v2193-fixes-oauth-device-approval-flaw-that-enables-account-takeover/
- Published: 2026-11-17T14:22:14.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-17T16:40:13.000Z
- Description: Pocket ID v2.19.3 fixes a high-severity flaw (CVSS 8.1) where a crafted link silently approves an attacker's OAuth device grant, enabling account takeover at connected services. Versions up to v2.19.2 are affected; update to v2.19.3.
- Author: Ping2Prompt Newsroom
- Tags: Pocket ID, Self-hosted, Vulnerabilities, High, #auto, #short-ping

## Pocket ID v2.19.3 closes a silent device-approval hole

Pocket ID v2.19.3 fixes a flaw that lets an attacker take over a user's account at a connected service. The victim only has to open a crafted link while signed in. The advisory rates it high, CVSS 8.1, with the vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N. The link silently approves the attacker's OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant, with no visible consent step. The attacker then gets full access, ID and refresh tokens for the victim's account at the relying party, the app that signs in through Pocket ID.

## How a login-code link becomes an approval request

The login-code page reads the code from the query string and submits it automatically when it loads. It strips only whitespace and dashes, then places the value unencoded in the request path `/one-time-access-token/${token}`. An attacker can supply a value like `../oidc/device/verify?code=ABCD1234`.

The browser normalizes it into a same-origin `POST /api/oidc/device/verify?code=ABCD1234`. That request carries the victim's session cookie and `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin`, so `http.CrossOriginProtection` lets it through.

## Why the verify endpoint approves an empty request

The backend handler `verifyDeviceCode` reads the user code from the query string and binds the body with `BindOptionalJSON`. An empty body means approve every requested scope. The endpoint needs only `authz.AccountAuthorize`, which any browser session satisfies.

It does not require that the consent screen was shown. Reauthentication is demanded only for clients flagged `RequiresReauthentication`, so other clients get no extra check.

## Pocket ID v2.19.2 and earlier are affected

The advisory lists the Go package `github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend` at v2.19.2 and earlier. It also says the flaw is present on main at commit 0691435 and in the v2.19.x release line. The same body-less POST trick can reach other authenticated endpoints that accept an empty body.

Examples are `POST /api/webauthn/logout` and, for admin victims, `POST /api/application-configuration/sync-ldap`. The advisory gives no information on exploitation, so the exploitation status is unknown.

## Update Pocket ID to v2.19.3

Upgrade to v2.19.3, the patched version of the backend package.

## What the Pocket ID advisory leaves out

The advisory gives no CVE id, no disclosure or patch dates, and no reporter credit.

| Product             | Affected   | Fixed   |
| ------------------- | ---------- | ------- |
| Pocket ID (backend) | <= v2.19.2 | v2.19.3 |

## Sources

- [github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-679c-xc3x](https://github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/security/advisories/GHSA-vrfp-679c-xc3x?ref=ping2prompt.com)

Image: [Image by TheDigitalWay from Pixabay](https://pixabay.com/photos/data-security-keyboard-computer-1590455/?ref=ping2prompt.com)

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