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    Ping2Prompt
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    Ping2Prompt story card: NetBird 0.80.0 fixes Windows service accounts treated as administrators. High, NetBird.

    NetBird 0.80.0 fixes Windows service accounts treated as administrators

    NetBird Windows Server

    NetBird Windows daemon trusted low-privilege service accounts

    NetBird's Windows daemon treated the LOCAL SERVICE and NETWORK SERVICE accounts as administrators. A compromised process running under either account could change privileged NetBird settings and run commands in the daemon's privileged context. The advisory metadata lists severity as medium.

    It gives no CVSS score or vector and no CVE id. The advisory does not say whether the flaw has been exploited, so the exploitation status is unknown.

    How a service-account process reaches admin control

    The daemon's named pipe is created so that every local principal can connect. Authorization is supposed to happen afterward, using the caller's kernel-derived token. That check is where the flaw sits. ipcauth.Identity.IsPrivileged() returns true for the LOCAL SERVICE (S-1-5-19) and NETWORK SERVICE (S-1-5-20) SIDs, grouping them with LOCAL SYSTEM, whether or not the caller is elevated or in the Administrators group.

    Microsoft documents these two accounts as minimum-privilege local accounts, unlike LOCAL SYSTEM, according to the advisory. Protected SetConfigRequest fields are gated by requirePrivilegeForConfigChange() and denyPrivileged(), which rely on that check.

    The attack chain to unauthenticated SSH

    The advisory describes a practical chain. The attacker enrolls a new profile into a NetBird account they control and enables ServerSSHAllowed, EnableSSHRoot and DisableSSHAuth. They then connect from another peer to get command execution in the privileged daemon context.

    This works because DisableSSHAuth makes the daemon call startSSHServer(nil, nil), and the SSH server installs a PasswordHandler only when JWT authentication is on. A reachable NetBird peer can then open a session without JWT authentication.

    The attacker needs local code execution as one of the two service accounts. Besides SSH, they could change privileged OS-user login or the profile's management configuration.

    NetBird on Windows, 0.76.0 up to 0.80.0

    The affected range is NetBird (Go package github.com/netbirdio/netbird) from 0.76.0 up to but not including 0.80.0. The flaw is in the Windows daemon's IPC authorization. Check the NetBird version on your Windows hosts. Hosts running services under LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE deserve the closest look, since a compromise of any of those is the starting point.

    Update NetBird to 0.80.0

    Upgrade to NetBird 0.80.0. The advisory text we have states no workaround and no disclosure or patch date. It also says the same primitive applies to other protected operations, but the text is truncated, so the full list is unknown.

    Product Affected Fixed
    NetBird (Windows daemon) >= 0.76.0, < 0.80.0 0.80.0

    Sources


    This story was produced with AI assistance from the sources listed above and fact-checked against them before publication. Read our editorial methodology and the corrections log. Spotted an error? Email [email protected].

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