In this article
What's fixed
OpenCTI's template verifier, called safeEjs, can be fooled by a crafted regular expression literal, so an authenticated user can run arbitrary JavaScript on the server. The bug sits in the verifier's comment-stripping step: the regex hides code from the check, while the original template still runs. The score is 8.8 (High) under CVSS 3.1. The attacker needs an account with CSVMAPPERS, SETTINGS_SETCUSTOMIZATION or SETTINGS_SETACCESSES. Users with no capabilities, the default KNOWLEDGE role and connector tokens were tested and could not exploit it.
The code runs with the platform process's privileges, which is root in the default container image, so database, broker and storage credentials are exposed. Affected versions are 7.260624.0 up to but not including 7.260811.0, plus LTS builds before 7.260309.0-lts.6. The fix is 7.260811.0 on mainline. For LTS, the advisory prose names 7.260309.0-lts.7, but its package metadata says lts.6, so take lts.7 or later. The advisory does not say whether anyone has exploited this in the wild.
What to do
Update to 7.260811.0, or to the LTS build of 7.260309.0-lts.7 or later. If you cannot update yet, limit the three capabilities to people you fully trust and check which service accounts and API tokens hold them. Look through stored notifier templates, JSON mapper formulas and e-mail templates for odd content, especially unusual regex literals, without rendering or testing them. Also check audit logs for template test and render actions by users you did not expect.
| Product | Affected | Fixed |
|---|---|---|
| OpenCTI (mainline) | >= 7.260624.0, < 7.260811.0 | 7.260811.0 |
| OpenCTI (7.260309.0 LTS) | < 7.260309.0-lts.6 | 7.260309.0-lts.7 (advisory metadata says lts.6) |
Sources
Image: Photo by Daniel Miksha on Unsplash
This story was produced with AI assistance from the sources listed above and fact-checked against them before publication. Read our editorial methodology and the corrections log. Spotted an error? Email [email protected].


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