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    A white fingerprint graphic on a black keyboard key, standing in for identity and authentication on a computer keyboard.
    Image by TheDigitalWay from Pixabay

    Pocket ID v2.19.3 fixes OAuth device approval flaw that enables account takeover

    Automated source check

    Pocket ID

    Pocket ID v2.19.3 closes a silent device-approval hole

    Pocket ID v2.19.3 fixes a flaw that lets an attacker take over a user's account at a connected service. The victim only has to open a crafted link while signed in. The advisory rates it high, CVSS 8.1, with the vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N. The link silently approves the attacker's OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant, with no visible consent step. The attacker then gets full access, ID and refresh tokens for the victim's account at the relying party, the app that signs in through Pocket ID.

    How a login-code link becomes an approval request

    The login-code page reads the code from the query string and submits it automatically when it loads. It strips only whitespace and dashes, then places the value unencoded in the request path /one-time-access-token/${token}. An attacker can supply a value like ../oidc/device/verify?code=ABCD1234.

    The browser normalizes it into a same-origin POST /api/oidc/device/verify?code=ABCD1234. That request carries the victim's session cookie and Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin, so http.CrossOriginProtection lets it through.

    Why the verify endpoint approves an empty request

    The backend handler verifyDeviceCode reads the user code from the query string and binds the body with BindOptionalJSON. An empty body means approve every requested scope. The endpoint needs only authz.AccountAuthorize, which any browser session satisfies.

    It does not require that the consent screen was shown. Reauthentication is demanded only for clients flagged RequiresReauthentication, so other clients get no extra check.

    Pocket ID v2.19.2 and earlier are affected

    The advisory lists the Go package github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend at v2.19.2 and earlier. It also says the flaw is present on main at commit 0691435 and in the v2.19.x release line. The same body-less POST trick can reach other authenticated endpoints that accept an empty body.

    Examples are POST /api/webauthn/logout and, for admin victims, POST /api/application-configuration/sync-ldap. The advisory gives no information on exploitation, so the exploitation status is unknown.

    Update Pocket ID to v2.19.3

    Upgrade to v2.19.3, the patched version of the backend package.

    What the Pocket ID advisory leaves out

    The advisory gives no CVE id, no disclosure or patch dates, and no reporter credit.

    Product Affected Fixed
    Pocket ID (backend) <= v2.19.2 v2.19.3

    Sources

    Image: Image by TheDigitalWay from Pixabay


    This story was produced with AI assistance from the sources listed above and fact-checked against them before publication. Read our editorial methodology and the corrections log. Spotted an error? Email [email protected].

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